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I. INTRODUCTION
The road Western Europe took from the end of World War II to its current state has been
one with lots of steep and sometimes blind curves, with harsh speed limits and frequent
detours. But still it has been one that attracted more and more traffic. After a successful
period of shaping a customs union and a free trade area following the Treaty of Rome
(1957), Europe became infected with Eurosclerosis in the seventies due to an increased
intensity of national regulation especially in the labor market. The constructionist approach
to harmonization from above slowed down the speed of integration almost to a halt. Only
the change of two fundamental rules revitalized the European integration process, namely
the introduction of majority voting in the EC Council and the mutual recognition of
national regulations brought about by the 1979 ruling of the European Court. With the
Single European Act and the launch of the Internal Market program Europhoria
blossomed out, finally leading to the Maastricht Treaty aimed at being the masterpiece of
European integration. Only very recently, the Danish "No" and the unconvincing approval
by the French voters cooled off hopes for a United States of Europe, signaling that
European integration is at the crossroads once again.
Analyzing what is at the roots of the weak public support for the Maastricht Treaty there
seems to be a deep mistrust in the member countries of the centralization of political and
economic decisions at Brussels. While the Single European Act and Project '92 freed the
EC of its bureaucratic chains by allowing for more flexibility in the integration process, the
Maastricht Treaty is sending out mixed signals at best on how integration will be pursued
in the 1990's. The introduction of the subsidiarity principle and the creation of a monetary
union are examples of the two polar ways by which integration can be brought about.
Subsidiarity allows subnational - or for that matter national - governments to take action inall areas that (a) do not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community and (b)
where the Community cannot achieve significantly better outcomes than the nation-states.
This goes along the lines of institutional competition. On the other hand, the creation of a
single European currency looks like yet another showcase of centralized ex-ante
harmonization. This paper analyzes whether the competition of national governments and
national regulations is a superior way of achieving economic and political integration in the
EC compared to the harmonization approach. It examines what is needed to make
institutional competition work in practice and what the problems of market oriented
integration are.
II. COMPETING GOVERNMENTS
The notion of. competing governments and jurisdictions was introduced by Tiebout (1956)
and has been a popular idea ever since. The core of the theory is that voters can vote with
their feet and that factors of production can move to other places as well. With respect to
production, competition among governments means that the immobile factors of
production (Siebert 1969) compete for those factors that are internationally mobile by
providing favorable conditions for production (Giersch 1989). The availability of immobile
factors is understood as a composite commodity made up of various aspects such as an
ample supply of land or labor and the quality of the work force. A variety of location
factors is provided or influenced by governments. We call these factors institutional
arrangements or regulations which may comprise laws, market regulations, economic
policies, in short everything that is under the control of governments and can possibly
influence the location decisions of mobile factors. Various authors put emphasis on
different locational factors that supposedly attract mobile factors. Razin, Sadka (1991)
analyze capital income taxation, Keen (1990) corporate taxation, and S. Sinn (1990)
infrastructure. Oates, Schwab (1988), Siebert (1989a,b), and Long, Siebert (1991) examine
institutional competition and environmental policy, Soltwedel (1987) regional policy and
Verbon (1990) social security.
Institutional competition can be illustrated best by thinking of a market for institutional
arrangements. National governments provide regulations in order to attract mobile factors.
The inflow of capital and firms is needed to create new and better jobs and to raise the
level of income so that voters reelect the incumbent governments. Institutional competitioncan work through two channels. Education may serve as an example. A government
introduces a new system of vocational training and pumps additional money into the
university system thereby creating a better educated, more able work force. Foreign firms
may find the pool of qualified labor an attractive asset of the location and decide to move
there. The relocation creates additional jobs and income and generates higher tax revenues
that can be used to improve on the quality of transportation infrastructure. This, in turn,
makes the location more attractive for firms. On the contrary, governments of countries
that face an outflow of capital and the emigration of firms are forced to improve the quality
of their domestic regulations. Thus, an incentive for thriving to invent ever better
institutional arrangements is included. In addition to direct government action, institutional
arrangements that have been successfully implemented in one country may serve as models
for other countries. The independence of the German Bundesbank which has fought off
inflation fairly successfully for more than three decades is a case in point. Slowly, central
banks in other countries are partially being freed from government intervention. The same
holds true for many more national regulations as diverse as the deregulation of financial
markets that started in London and is now spreading across Europe, the privatization of
state-owned firms, now even popular in Italy, and the point system for traffic offences in
Great Britain and Germany, recently introduced in France.
The alternative to institutional competition is ex-ante harmonization: negotiators from all
member countries agree on a set of rules that is going to become European law, replacing
the respective national laws. A strenuous bargaining process is needed, and the seventies
have shown that an ex-ante harmonization is impractical. The European integration
process came to a standstill. Institutional competition, on the contrary, is an open-ended
process (Siebert 1991), the results of which "are in their nature unpredictable" (Hayek
1984, p. 258). Whenever governments recognize that domestic regulations are too
inefficient for citizens or companies, they face an incentive to repair or set up an entirely
new system which may or may not copy successful solutions in other countries. This makes
integration flexible and more acceptable especially for small member countries. It allows
countries to take measures according to their individual preferences. It is hard to see why
there have to be identical tax and environmental policies, one specific pension scheme or
even worse, equalization of wages due to the so called social dimension of the Internal
Market. Given the diversity of national political systems and economies in Europe,
institutional competition allows governments to react individually to changes in theirrespective environments, trying out new solutions to new problems. This minimizes the cost
of failure through using the market for regulations as an exploratory device for finding the
best institutional arrangements (Hayek 1968).
The essential prerequisite for institutional competition to work is mobility of residents as
economic agents (and as voters) and of factors of production, either labor or capital.
Otherwise arbitrage between different national settings cannot take place. With respect to
capital mobility this precondition seems to be fulfilled in Europe (Frankel 1991). All EC
members have abolished capital controls with the minor exceptions of Portugal and Ireland
which have promised to follow suit. Physical capital is also free to flow where investment
opportunities are most profitable, though one has to bear in mind that capital once put in
place is often immobile from then on and can only be relocated through depreciation. The
same holds true for technology that is embodietl in capital. Blueprints seem to be mobile to
some extent depending on the patent system and property rights defining the conditions for
international transferability of knowledge. In addition, consumers are mobile in that they
can choose between national goods markets in the EC's many border regions and by
buying through mail-order companies. Labor mobility, on the other hand, is still fairly low
although there are not too many legal impediments to migration. It seems that people
identify with their regions and that Europe is still diverse enough to make country specific
human capital obsolete when crossing borders. In Europe's many border regions, however,
labor mobility has already reached significant levels. Along the French-German border
many French workers are employed in Germany while many Germans have settled in
France holding on to their jobs in Germany. If this development spreads across Europe the
effectiveness of institutional competition will increase further.
III. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION
The famous 1979 ruling of the European Court made the country-of-origin principle
omnipresent in the EC's goods markets. Barriers to market entry such as the German
purity law for beer dating back to 1517 and the Italian noodle regulations, were no longer
binding for foreign suppliers although it is left to the individual firm to stick to the old
procedures as a mark of quality. Institutional competition in the form of the country-of-
origin principle has put national regulations for products on trial, with the consumers being
the jury. Now that the Internal Market program has almost been completed, the scope ofthe country-of-origin principle could, however, be expanded further because a wide range
of products has been excluded so far, and the respective markets are still segmented.
Transportation, telecommunications, the insurance business, banking, the airline industry,
and utilities are major sectors that are far from being one European market. Institutional
competition could dismantle the remaining national market segmentations, allowing, for
example, Dutch carriers to offer service from Paris to Brussels or German drivers to insure
their cars with British insurance companies. The first slow steps have been taken in the
right direction. The Second Banking Directive allows banks to open up branches
everywhere in Europe once they have obtained a banking license in their respective home
countries. The supervising authority will be that of the domestic country with the foreign
authority only supervising liquidity and the protection against risks in securities operations.
Also, some parts of the insurance business have been europeanized, but important product
lines such as car insurance are still excluded. Even the deregulation of the European
airline industry is just now starting to make progress. The fact, however, that most
European airlines are still owned by the government and treated as national flag (and
pride) carriers makes delays in the implementation of the deregulation program more than
a remote possibility.
Policymakers are under constant pressure from national interest groups to protect their
specific interests. Olson (1965) argued that lobbies are all the better organized and more
influential the higher expected payoffs are and the more evenly the costs can be spread on
a large number of those financing the payoffs. If European integration were pursued
through direct harmonization, the power of well organized interest groups to influence the
decisions at the bargaining table in Brussels would grow since payoffs would increase while
the costs could be spread among even more citizens. This would give rise to a Europe of
minimum consensus or of widespread protectionism. Agricultural policy is a case in point.
With institutional competition rent-seekers will be less influential because even if a
favorable institutional arrangement could be pushed through in one country the other
countries are not forced to follow: an anonymous market process evaporates the power of
national interest groups (Siebert 1991). In addition, market based integration requires less
bureaucracy in Brussels, not to mention the costs that can be avoided by not having
negotiators of twelve countries sitting at the table in Brussels discussing the details of yet
another product norm.6
The strength of institutional competition partly derives from the observation that
politicians and governments are of the Leviathan-type, i.e. their actions are primarily aimed
at maximizing their own utility (income, power, prestige etc.) instead of increasing general
welfare. The reason why this type of administrative failure occurs is that the voters' power
to control governments is marginal since it can be exercised only every four or five years. In
addition, bureaucrats more or less completely withdraw from public scrutiny. Institutional
competition can act as another check. It works in that consumers, investors, firms, and
workers have an additional way of voting - voting with one's feet or purse, the so called exit
option (Hirschman 1970). This mechanism forces governments to work more efficiently
and on behalf of their voters. It is a device to tame the Leviathan (Brennan, Buchanan
1980, S. Sinn 1990).
It is not hard to foresee that mobile factors will react more sensitively to the effective
burdens of regulations in general and taxation in particular in a world where they can easily
move abroad. The consequences will be twofold. Since firms will not long tolerate high
corporate income taxes governments have to offer something in exchange. Institutional
competition will move the taxation of mobile factors towards benefit taxation, where the
user and the payer of a good are identical, approaching the concept of fiscal equivalence
(Olson 1969). The second consequence will be that financing redistribution in favor of
immobile factors through taxing mobile ones will only be feasible to the extent that
transactions and mobility costs prevent the mobile factors from emigrating. Especially
those countries will have to rethink their welfare systems that heavily depend on
corporations for financing welfare programs such as France, which gets more than 40
percent of its welfare expenditures financed by corporations (Weber, Leienbach, Dohle
1991).
IV. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION IN PRATICE
Companies often claim that diverging institutional arrangements (regarding education,
health care, social security, taxation, environmental protection etc.) produce different costs
and therefore distort competition between firms residing in different countries. They
demand, therefore, that regulations be harmonized, envisaging a level playing-field. For
instance, legislation protecting the environment differs substantially within the Community
and firms that have to obey stiff environmental laws face a cost disadvantage. Thetheoretical counterargument is that stiffer environmental laws simply reflect the higher
ranking that good environment quality enjoys in a country's preference set. If preferences
and endowments vary so should the specialization of an economy - familiar advice from
standard trade theory. As a practical matter it can be observed that the cost disadvantages
originating from higher environmental standards are in most cases only marginal to the
overall costs firms incur (Dean 1992). Tobey (1990) found no empirical support for the
hypothesis that the introduction of stringent environmental control measures changed
trade patterns significantly. In the long run, the need to obey strict laws protecting the
environment may even give firms a leading edge in the production of devices for
environmental protection. The country as a whole may gain a comparative advantage in the
development and production of such goods.
It is argued that in some areas institutional competition is no longer necessary because
important factors that can distort competition in goods markets have already been or are
currently being harmonized. Directives on working conditions define minimum standards
for health protection of workers, technical standards such as those negotiated under the
auspices of the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) reduce transaction costs
in international trade. The administration of the VAT in the borderless market is designed
to keep the destination principle alive, and minimum rates for excise taxes are agreed
upon. In some cases like establishing European technical standards harmonization makes
sense, in other areas such as VAT it does not. Here, a rather complicated interim solution
had to be implemented shifting the previous tax border inside the individual firm.
Institutional competition may still help to find a new and more efficient solution in the
future. For instance, direct consumer imports and mail-order firms are effective devices for
enforcing institutional competition. To bring about airtight harmonization with respect to
indirect taxation, countries that rely on excise taxes only marginally had to be forced to
raise their tax rates (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands with only about seven percent of
total tax revenues). Through this, firms in high tax countries were protected from losing
customers. Low tax countries found it comfortable to increase tax rates since this bestows
additional tax revenues on them. The lid that institutional competition is intended to put on
governments ability to collect tax revenues has been lifted.
Another argument put forward against institutional competition is that it will lead to levels
of regulations that are below the optimum. This is referred to as the problem of zero-regulation. An example that has been frequently cited is tax competition (for an optimistic
view see McLure 1986, for a more negative one see H.-W. Sinn 1990). A country may
attract foreign firms by reducing its corporate income tax. Since other countries face
emigration of firms they will follow suit in reducing their own rates destroying the
advantages of the other country which might in turn start the next round of tax cuts.
Empirical support is easily available: the EC's average corporate income tax rate dropped
from 46.75 percent in 1984 to as little as 39.23 percent in 1991. Income and capital income
tax rates exhibit a similar pattern. Does that mean institutional competition is a bad thing
because it leaves countries without tax revenues and without proper regulations in general?
The answer - again - is no. Razin, Sadka (1989) show that even if countries engage in tax
competition the harmonization of tax rates would not yield any welfare gains at all.
Moreover, looking only at the revenue side of taxes and regulations keeps one from seeing
the other side of the coin. Cutting tax rates may generate higher tax revenues which
conincides to the simultaneous decline in corporate tax rates and (modest) absolute
increase in tax revenues in some countries. If cutting tax rates, however, decreases tax
revenues governments' ability to finance public spending will shrink. If public spending
exhibits diminishing marginal returns, cutting these expenditures will lead to increasing
welfare losses whereas the benefits of lower taxes will decrease. At some point, the
opportunity costs of cutting taxes will offset the benefits of doing so and rational
governments will stop lowering the tax burden (Siebert 1990). In general, the net welfare
effect of a marginal change in the level of a regulation (or a tax rate) should be zero,
marginal costs and benefits should be equal.
S. Sinn (1990) proposes that one way of attracting foreign capital and firms is to use tax
revenues to provide excellent infrastructure to stimulate private sector productivity, i.e. to
make private investment more profitable. An extensive road and railroad system, airports
providing connection to many destinations, and good and cheap telecommunications may
make a location attractive. Improved infrastructure also lowers transport costs which are a
natural basis for market segmentations. Empirical evidence on that matter, however, is
inconclusive at best. Aschauer (1989) showed for the U.S. that publicly provided
infrastructure had a major positive impact on private capital productivity. Ford, Poret
(1991), on the contrary, could confirm the Aschauer findings only for U.S. post-war data
but not for the other OECD countries and not for longer periods of time. The weak
econometric support for the theoretically appealing hypothesis may be due to the fact thatinfrastructure and thus transport cost is just one locational factor among many others.
Nevertheless, Krugman (1991) argues that transport costs will be an important factor in the
structural adjustment process following the completion of the Internal Market. Depending
on transport costs, the size of economies of scale, and the share of footloose industries,
different location patterns may emerge. If transport costs fell significantly, comparative
(production) cost advantages could finally come to play their roles. Firms would locate
some of their production activities to the periphery, especially for labor-intensive goods,
thereby preventing a de-industrialization of the periphery, a "Mezzogjornification"
(Krugman 1991, p. 80). In a Europe with institutional competition, closing firms and
outflowing capital provide strong incentives for governments to improve the infrastructure.
In this line of reasoning, institutional competition can be a mechanism for achieving
efficiency in production and a means of regional policy in that it counteracts the
peripherization of regions.
In border regions, some people argue, institutional competition cannot work because
consumers can arbitrage differences in regulations without having to relocate. That means
they can take advantage of regulations abroad without having to pay for it. The small
border between Luxembourg and Germany is an example. Every day thousands of
Germans cross the border to get gas in Luxembourg where the tax on petroleum is just a
fraction of the German rate. Thus, Germany loses tax revenues. However, if there are
problems in border regions then these are rather problems for the small countries. To the
German Minister of Finance it does not really matter whether a handful of Germans avoid
the tax on gas, but what if the tax rates were set the other way round and virtually all
Luxembourgians would buy their gas in Germany? Although the government of
Luxembourg would understandably regret to do so, it must lower its tax rate. This is just
the kind of arbitrage that limits governments ability to raise ever bigger tax revenues.
Border regions are the places where institutional competition works best.
This example, however, indicates that there may be some scope for strategic behavior on
the side of the governments. Since the number of participants in the market for regulations
is small and the good traded is not homogeneous, governments of big countries might exert
some monopoly power. Take national product norms as an example. Historically,
governments have imposed a wide range of obligations on producers on the grounds of
consumer protection and public saftey. Through mutual recognition of product norms the10
different levels of obligations (and associated costs) are increasingly seen as distorting the
movement of goods within the EC. This is particularly obvious when taking into account
that governments frequently used product norms to protect domestic firms and industries.
One way of getting rid of different product norms is to harmonize them away as the EC
attempted to do prior to 1985. The alternative is institutional competition which, however,
may exhibit one possible shortcoming. If governments obey domestic interest groups to
lower domestic safety standards in order to restore competitiveness of domestic producers,
the level of regulation may finally fall below some type of optimum. We have shown above
that this problem of zero-regulation is unlikely to arise because the opportunity costs of
such a policy are high for any government. Nevertheless, if the market is not fully
competitive, a counterbalancing force may be introduced, such as a liability law, e.g the EC
Product Liability Directive which became effective in 1985. At the heart of the directive is
the principle that the producer of a good will be liable for any damage caused by a defect
in this product. Two details are important: (a) that producer is everybody who puts his
name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and (b) that a domestic
consumer can sue for compensation against all producers in the EC and worldwide
(because importers of non-EC goods are legal substitutes for the non-EC producers).
Thus, by providing the consumer with a legal instrument, the firms' chances to make profits
by supplying ever cheaper goods at ever lower safety standards are reduced significantly.
The Liability Directive only introduced a minimum (albeit strict) standard of consumer
rights. National governments are still allowed to go further but in that case they face the
pressures of institutional competition.
V. CAN GOVERNMENTS COMPETE AFTER MAASTRICHT?
If institutional competition is as advantageous as described above then why is it not
Europe's accepted integration strategy? One of the major goals of institutional competition
is to break up the deadlocks of markets segmented by national regulations. This leads to
fiercer competition which is, understandably, not extended a warm welcome by firms and
sectors that prospered under the protection of national regulations. Industrial policy, as
government interference with the sectoral structure of an economy is euphemistally called,
has been given new momentum through chapter 13 of the Maastricht Treaty. From now on
it is an agreed part of the Community's economic policies. In the early days of industrial
policy,, ailing industries or sectors were barred from competition either by closing the EC11
to the rest of the world or paying subsidies to maintain production and jobs. Backed by
recent advances in growth and trade theory, the new variety of industrial policy aims at
supporting selected industries that promise to produce above average profits, growth rates
and (so politicians hope) plenty of new employment opportunities. There are numerous
measures that the Community can take to achieve its goals (strategic trade policy,
exceptions from competition policy," subsidization of research and development, taking
over of exchange rate risks) and quite a few industries that claim to be natural candidates
for protection and subsidies.
To examine this type of policy prescription accept for a moment the theoretical reasoning
for strategic industrial policy: if significant sunk costs cement monopoly profits, subsidizing
research and development may lead to more competition. If learning-by-doing allows for
cheaper production, large numbers of products sold and large market shares may act as
barriers to market entry. Therefore, financing initial losses of newcomers may actually
enhance competition. Since Airbus Industries faced both problems, high sunk costs and
significant learning effects, it can serve as a litmus test. Launched with massive subsidies in
the 1970's, Airbus broke into the Boeing controlled market for large jet aircraft, now
enjoying a market share of 27 percent. Bletschacher, Klodt (1992) view this as a success
insofar as it was possible to allow a new producer to enter the market and secure him a
sufficient market share. The costs of this policy, however, must also be taken into account.
Subsidies amounting to some US-$ 20 billion were handed over to Airbus and even after 20
years in business, the share of subsidies for developing a new Airbus is beyond 70 percent.
Therefore it is not coming as a surprise that, according to Klepper (1990), the net welfare
effect of Airbus' market entry is negative for Europe, suggesting that the Airbus project
actually decreased European welfare. When the market was modelled as basically being a
Boeing monopoly the net welfare effect for the world was significantly negative as well.
Thus, even in a case where theoretical justitfications for industrial policy are at hand, the
practical results are unconvincing. The Airbus example also illustrates that there are other
problems typical for industrial policy. The decision on where production plants should be
located was dominated by political considerations giving rise to inefficient production
schemes und thus operational losses.
There are important theoretical reasons as well for not accepting the recommendations of
industrial policy advocates. Organizational problems of ever bigger firms can offset size12
related cost reductions. It is no wonder that giant firms such as IBM reshape, stressing
smaller and sometimes competing units. Conglomerates merged in the seventies are now
streamlined. Corporate integration is replaced by strategic alliances that narrowly define
the fields of cooperation and stay competitive otherwise. Moreover, the scope of increasing
returns to scale is limited by the consumers' preferences for differentiated products.
Another counter-argument is the information problem stressed by Hayek. Extensive
information is needed in order to select promising industries - a problem known as 'picking
the winners'. Governments probably do not possess better information than private firms
and - what is even more important - not the same incentive to gather and process it
because in case of a failure (due to the lack of information) politicians will not be held fully
liable. In general, there are strong arguments against industrial policy as envisaged in the
Maastricht Treaty.
Industrial policy is not desirable at the Community level and it is not at the national level.
The reasons for not approving of an EC industrial policy are valid for national industrial
policies as well. In addition, competing national industrial policies inevitably lead to an
inefficient subsidy race. Competition of national industrial policies is inferior to industrial
policy at the Community level, which in turn is inferior to no industrial policy at any level.
What is needed to avoid industrial policy at all is a mechanism through which every
government can commit itself credibly not to pursue an industrial policy. This is of course
not a problem specific to the EC but to world markets. As proposed by Hofman, Koop
(1991), the GATT could be extended from basically a free trade agreement to a
comprehensive competition agreement where each signatory promises not to engage in
industrial policy even if that means to forgo potential domestic growth. The returns of the
agreement would stem from all other countries also sacrificing their national industrial
policies.
The fact that the European car makers will also get handouts from the EC for their
research activities illustrates that the EC has taken the protectionist road. In contrast to the
aircraft industry, the world market for cars is highly competitive. What weakens
competition is not so much the existence of high sunk costs or significant economies of
scales but rather heavy subsidization of national producers and protectionism in the form
of trade barriers. Here institutional competition and the country-of-origin principle could
help to break up market segmentations. Allowing, for instance, German importers of13
Japanese cars to sell their imports to French customers would soon put the subsidized
firms under enormous pressure to cut costs and produce better cars - and politicians under
a lot of pressure to save the national firms and jobs. Here again, Europe is at the
crossroads. One direction is to force national producers to adjust to market pressures
which could be made easier by governments through improving institutional arrangements.
The other would be to annul institutional competition and coordinate national policies,
subsidizing firms inside the EC and protect them from outside competition through
building the fortress Europe. By pressing Japan to agree on voluntary export restraints and
thereby upgrading national protectionism to the European level, the EC has apparently
decided in favor of the second way. Now European car makers have to compete with only
1.2 million Japanese imports in an estimated 15 million sales a year market. Even worse,
some countries are allowed to maintain national quotas (of as little as five percent in the
case of France). The period for which protection will be granted to European car makers
is actually limited to the end of this century. Expectations, however, exist that some of them
can not appreciably narrow the productivity gap with their Japanese competitors.
Therefore it is not unlikely that another protecionist period will be announced.
Moreover, there are signs that other European industries as well feel they are not ready to
withstand international competition and that some governments are prepared to protect
these industries. The list of sectors thirsting for protection is impressive: electronics,
shipbuilding, motor vehicles, steel, and most prominent, agriculture. Impressive too is the
damage done. Without a drastic reform of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
free trade cannot be perennially preserved. As long as some trading partners blatantly
disobey the rules of free trade, the world's trading system faces the risk of returning to
bilateralism and regional bloc building. Without a change of the trade policy towards the
reforming countries of Eastern Europe, the transformation process there may stall with
equally gloomy consequences.
VI. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION
Social policy has never been at the heart of the European integration process. Although
even the CAP was partly justified by social security considerations, there are only a few
hints in the integration treaties that deal with social problems. The social dimension debate
comprises three aspects: redistribution (e.g. welfare programs), social policy (everything14
from health care and old-age pension schemes to maternity benefits), and labor market
regulations (working conditions, systems of wage bargaining and labor representation and
participation). As these fields are tightly interconnected and complex we only choose to
highlight some of the problems arising in the process of closer EC integration. With
respect to redistribution, we have shown that it will get increasingly difficult to redistribute
from mobile factors of production to immobile ones.
An interesting question is whether national social policies require harmonization. Ex-ante
harmonization would only be justifiable if the outcomes of competitive social, policies
where either considered unfair or inefficient due to market failure. Paqud (1989) examined
various absolute and comparative criteria for fairness but failed to identify even a single
one that would call for harmonization. Leaving the fairness issue to philosophers, we rather
turn to the possibility that institutional competition in social policies leads to an inefficient
allocation of resources. Consider a country that improves its social policies. This can have
two effects. On the one hand, it may reduce investment risks and increase profitability
through higher labor productivity brought about by fewer sick-leaves and strikes. This in
turn could induce an inflow of capital and qualified labor to some extent. On the other
hand, more expensive social programs increase effective wages since they are largely
financed through wage related payments such as the general income tax or wage
dependent social insurance contributions levied on employees and employers. More
expensive labor changes factor intensities and the production of labor-intensive goods will
be shifted to countries with lower labor costs. If factor mobility is unrestricted, the shift in
the international division of labor depends on the magnitudes of the real wage change and
the productivity effect of improved social programs. A need to harmonize social policies on
the grounds of an inefficient allocation of resources cannot be found. Moreover, social
policy can be interpreted as a location factor since it is largely administered according to
the territory principle. Analogous to infrastructure or education, competing social policies
would simply force governments to adopt efficient social programs.
There are good reasons to organize the various components of the social security system
(unemployment, inability, old age pensions) whenever possible as a user-pays-system where
benefits are linked to contributions paid as in the German case. In the European case this
means that the concept of benefit taxation should be applied analogously to the social
security system. More specifically, every person insured should receive the benefits in the15
area where the contributions were paid (territory principle). Thus, the social security
system is not a centralized European one but a set of independent national systems being
in institutional competition with each other.
Two objections can be raised to competing social policies. First, it is argued that this
integration approach would make the poor EC members poorer. Instead of achieving
cohesion, income disparities would deepen which would makes additional intra-
Community transfers necessary. However, the inflow of capital will cause labor productivity
to increase and consequently wages to rise. Taking into account that the demand for social
policies exhibits a high positive income elasticity, social services in the countries with low
present per-capita income will improve as well. At least in the long run this counters the
second objection to competing social policies, namely the reproach of "social dumping".
Social dumping, understood as cutting social policies in the richer countries in order to
restore competitiveness, oversees the negative effects that these cuts may have on labor
productivity in particular and social stability in general. Only in extended welfare states
where governments implemented a generous network of social programs actual cuts may
occur. But again, that would be a situation in which the marginal costs of an institutional
arrangement would exceed its marginal benefits. Competing social policies could be a
device to make corrections necessary and at the same time politically feasible.
Another area where institutional competition can be fruitfully applied are labor market
regulations, especially the national systems of wage bargaining. At present, only directives
on minimum standards of working conditions and health and safety provisions are ratified
or drafted. Harmonization of any substance does not exist. Article 118 of the Maastricht
Treaty, however, calls for closer cooperation on labor participation in firms' decision
making, legal provisions of labor contracts, and collective wage bargaining. So far, the
national systems of wage bargaining differ substantially in the EC. Competition of the
systems will prove which one scores best on employment and inflation. Moreover,
institutional competition would force governments to check the efficiency of other labor
market regulations as well, for instance job security legislation or the monopolies of state-
run employment exchanges.16
VII. HARMONIZING MONEY
The Maastricht Treaty has put macroeconomics back on the EC's agenda and it has done
so by applying the ex-ante harmonization approach. The most exposed single issue is the
creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the design of a single currency for
twelve different nations with twelve heterogeneous sets of preferences regarding price level
stability, twelve distinct histories of monetary policies, twelve inflation track records and
twelve systems of administering monetary policy.
The risk of creating a weak European currency partly derives from the possibility of
merging countries with different attitudes towards monetary stability and different levels of
economic development. Therefore, participation in EMU was made dependent on the
fulfillment of various convergence criteria: total government debt must be less than 60
percent of GDP and annual budget deficits must be smaller than 3 percent of GDP. The
inflation rate may only be 1.5 percentage points above the average inflation rate of the
three lowest inflation rates in the EC. Finally, the exchange rate may not have been
devalued two years before entering EMU and long term interest rates must broadly be in
line with comparable rates in the low inflation countries.
By setting quantitative criteria in advance, the Maastricht Treaty seeks to mitigate the risk
of a weak Euro-currency. However, two objections must be raised. First, the quality of
some indicators is uncertain. For obvious reasons, the requirement of a low budget deficit
in the year before entering EMU should have been extended for a number of consecutive
years and it should include stealth budgets. The criterion on indebtedness conveys limited
information. It reflects a long history of running up debts and it does not take into account
whether the funds were used for consumption or investment. Therefore, the number 60
seems to be chosen arbitrarily. On the contrary, the interest rate and inflation criteria are
useful measures because they comprise an element of competition. If, for example, a low
inflation country reduces its inflation rate it simultaneously forces high inflation countries
to follow suit - a competition for stable money. To enhance this competition, the European
Council and the Commission will be constantly assessing the stabilization efforts (and
success) of the member countries. In the second half of the decade they will even be
allowed to enforce this goal through withholding EC benefits - another safeguard clause
for achieving economic stability.17
Second, a serious question will be to what extent the criteria will be interpreted in a
politically soft way in order to bring countries into EMU that would normally not qualify
for membership. For instance, the wish of the EC-founding countries Belgium and Italy to
also co-found EMU may generate pressures to soften the interpretation of the convergence
criteria. In that case monetary stability would be at risk because a European monetary
policy that aims for stable money needs accomodation by sound national fiscal policies.
The main problem for the EMU will be to transfer credibility from the national central
banks to their European successor. One important aspect is that the national central banks
are independent before a European currency would start. A period of independence of at
least two years in which national central banks could build up a reputation of pursuing an
independent monetary policy would be helpful. The political decision of some countries to
make the central bank independent just the second before the starting signal of monetary
union calls the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) into question and
undermines its credibility even before it is founded.
Even if the ECB is legally independent, it may not be in practice. National ECB governors
who seek re-appointment after serving a relatively short term may choose to please their
national governments by voting for a less stringent monetary policy. The most decisive
issue, however, is whether a European monetary policy can be insulated from the moral
hazard problem of political pressure. A European monetary policy affects each region of
Europe in a uniform way - the same interest rate will be effective from Aberdeen to
Heraklion; but the policy making process remains at the national level. This represents a
systematic source of conflict, and it is hard to say to what extent a European monetary
policy can withstand this conflict. A European Central Bank needs extremely strong
safeguards in such a context and it is open whether institutional arrangements with respect
to fiscal policy can provide sufficiently strong ones.
Leaving aside such intricate issues as the ECB's independence, the level of transfers
needed in a currency union without exchange rates and the willingness of countries to pay
the price of transfers in favor of European integration, the central question is whether the
EC is an optimum currency area. As Eichengreen (1991) shows, the EC does not fulfill the
requirements for an optimum currency area too well, i.e. high factor mobility and no18
region-specific shocks and disturbances. Possibly, the Internal Market leads to more
specialization of regions, due to the fact that firms are increasingly able to exploit
economies of scale. This would make European economies even more diverse - not less. As
German unification has proven, asymmetric shocks cannot be ruled out. Then, flexible
nominal exchange rates are more important than before to adjust to real shocks. The
foreign exchange turmoil of mid-September 1992 has lent additional support to this view.
Two devalutions and suspension of two currencies from the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) have shown that the degree of economic convergence is lower than
expected.
Although the ERM has, by and large, functioned properly its recent shake-up made it
obvious that the system is in need of repair. A solution may consist in allowing competition
between the national central banks and the institutional rules defining their behavior such
as operating procedures, monetary policy instruments, money targets and the space to
manouvre in open market operations. Those banks and currencies could merge of their
own free will that have similar institutional arrangements (reflecting similar preferences on
stable money), low inflation rates and that represent economies that have converged close
enough to make exchange rates unnecessary for internal adjustments-. This leaves open how
many currencies join and when they do. The "new" central bank could start with the
credibility it inherits from its national predecessors that must be truly independent
beforehand. Imagine the Netherlands, Germany and Austria forming a currency union,
institutionalizing the policies they have pursued for years. The other countries would be left
with an adjustment mechanism to absorb real shocks that hit their economies and the
central banks would face an incentive to build up their own credibility. This solution,
however, calls for a more flexible approach to EC membership than the current "all or
none".
VIII. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Monetary policy may be viewed as a field in which transaction costs can be reduced by
some type of ex-ante harmonization. Another example are technical standards where
voluntary agreement by the affected industries reduces transaction costs. Thus, there are
circumstances under which institutional competition does not yield efficient solutions.
Especially, problems arising in the EC's external trade policy, international competition19
policy, and transfrontier problems in environmental policy can only be solved at the
European level. In these cases the process of institutional competition has to be
supplemented by additional measures.
To determine what measures are appropriate to support institutional competition, the
more general question has to be answered which constitutional structure is envisaged for
the future of Europe. There is a continuum of possible constitutional structures reaching
from a centralized political entity to a loose confederation of independent states. As the
referendum in Denmark (and that in France) showed, Europe is not ready for political
union. Euroscepticism is largely fed by governments that are moving towards centralization
more readily than their electorates approve of and that abuse monetary union as a
precursor for political union.
To soothe the voters in Denmark and elsewhere the Council and the Commission
introduced the subsidiarity principle and emphasized it at the Birmingham summit.
Subsidiarity which delegates all policy matters to the lowest level of government that can
cope with them, in principle counteracts centralization forces. However, serious doubts
about its effectiveness remain. As has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Sachverstandigenrat
1992), it will be very difficult to put the subsidiarity principle into concrete terms,
describing what each level of government is allowed to do. The key question is whether
subsidiarity will be justiciable or whether it will only survive as a noble principle of political
theory bar any practical value. The suspicion that it will not be justiciable derives from the
fact that the Maastricht Treaty does not set down specific rights of national governments
and citizens that in case of conflict could be used by the European Court as a guideline for
decision-making.
To make institutional competition work in practice, Siebert, Koop (1990) proposed a set of
rules that governments have to obey. In addition to a European liability law, the rules
envisaged also include that countries have to stay open for goods and services, people, and
capital with respect to their EC partners. Capital flows and trade with the rest of the world
should be unrestricted. Moreover, a truly European, competition policy for firms has to
protect national governments from the powers of EC-wide monopolies. In the case of
trans-border externalities, e.g. environmental pollution, rules for the internalization of
externalities have to be included. Obedience to these rules for governments would have to20
be checked by an independent European body. This is of course a solution that very much
favors a compromise between the two extreme constitutional alternatives: centralization
where necessary, independence where possible.
IX. DIFFERENT TIERS OF EUROPE
Officially, the Community is still marching in step: every country is sticking to the
Community. In practice, the EC is already moving in another direction. Britain opted out
of Maastricht's social chapter, the European Monetary Union is limited to countries that
fulfill the convergence criteria. The Danes voted "No" on monetary as well as political
union, the passport-free zone envisaged in the Schengen Agreement comprises only eight
members. Finally, a common defence policy was launched by setting up a joint Franco-
German army corps. One variety of institutional competition could be to allow for different
degrees of membership.
Tichy (1992) extends the idea of an optimum currency area to an optimum integration
area. He finds that for any plausible indicator the EC is too diverse to be an optimum
integration area. On the one hand, it comprises only loosely connected countries (Denmark
and Portugal) while, on the other hand, it excludes economies (Austria) that are tightly
interconnected with EC-economies (Germany). Even worse, for different integration
criteria different groupings of countries are optimal. This suggests that there should be
different tiers of the European Community with one Treaty for every broadly defined
policy matter. This would facilitate the deepening as well as the further enlargement of the
Community. Currently Europe shifts towards a system with a core of monetary stability
comprising Germany, the Netherlands, and possibly Belgium, Luxembourg, and France.
With institutional competition and different tiers of integration, the core could be extended
by Austria and possibly Switzerland.
Institutional competition will allow to keep the EC open. It could be especially helpful in
the process of integrating the former communist countries into the EC, especially Poland,
Hungary, and whatever is left of Czechoslovakia. It would be particularly adventageous if
the EC decided to give up its own protectionist policies towards Eastern Europe. Opening
up the EC markets for agricultural products and textiles would tremendously help the
Eastern European countries to export goods where they have a comparative advantage,21
thereby supporting their transformation into market economies. In addition, this may help
to avoid mass-migration from East to West and force the Community to reform its
outdated CAP. For the transition itself, institutional competition seems to be the
appropriate strategy since proper experience on that matter is lacking or limited at best.
Exchange rate policies, privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, avoiding social
upheaval, and the more general question of sequencing, i.e. gradualism versus shock
therapy cannot be answered beforehand and in a way that meets the specific needs of each
country. As a matter of fact, the former socialist economies are already engaging in
institutional competition with developing countries in the sense that they compete for
foreign direct investment. The need to attract foreign capital acts as a strong incentive for
governments to keep the transformation process going (and as a pleasant political
scapegoat for unpopular reforms).
For this to occur, different tiers of government and different degrees of membership must
be allowed. For the first part of this proposal, fiscal federalism and subsidiarity are the
catchwords: leave the provision of local public goods to local governments that compete in
the Tieboutian sense, leave education to state or federal governments, and assign only all-
European tasks such as competition policy or foreign policy and defence to the
Community. The second part envisages a more flexible Europe, with the possibility for
countries to choose the policy areas where they want to join collective government. All
member countries (present and future) would have to acccept a core of rules which defines
the EC. For the time being, these rules would have to be economic and could consist, for
example, of the EC's Internal Market program. For other policy matters, countries that are
willing and suited for further integration can move ahead, without being stopped by
countries not willing to integrate. The question, however, whether institutional competition
or ex-ante harmonization will be the predominant integration strategy for the 1990's
reflects a deeper schism. Among the current EC members the role of states and
governments is assessed differently: either as welfare states or as competition states. The
public discussion which one is to serve as the model for Europe has just begun. Until this
question will have been answered, Europe remains at the crossroads, politically and
economically.22
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